STATE of NORTH CAROLINA / COUNTY of NEW HANOVER / CITY of WILMINGTON
in the GENERAL COURT of JUSTICE / DISTRICT COURT DIVISION
ISABELLE ANNE SHEPHERD
plaintiff
v.
WILLIAM DAWSON GAGE
defendant
MOTION to SET ASIDE JUDGMENT and MOTION to WITHDRAW CENSURE and TERMINATE SENTENCE for FINDING of CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
HERE NOW comes the defendant, William Dawson Gage, whose purpose is to move this court that the judgment in the 50C proceeding known as “Shepherd v. Gage” and recorded in the County of New Hanover as 19 CVD 3461, which was rendered in favor of the plaintiff by Judge Chad Hogston on 27 September 2019, be set aside pursuant to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 60B(3), (4), (5) and (6) which provide criteria for relief from a judgment.
COMES also the defendant with the purpose to move this court in the person of the responsible official, Judge Chad Hogston, that in the matter of his finding of criminal contempt for failure to comply with aforementioned order (recorded as 19 CR 4961 on 15 November 2019) that Judge Hogston revisit his finding pursuant to NCGS 5A-12(c) and that he withdraw his censure of defendant and terminate defendant’s sentence of 2 years supervised probation with 90 days suspended sentence: defendant would show the court that such withdrawal and termination are warranted (as the statute provides) by the conduct of the “contemnor” (holistically considered) and by “the ends of justice”.
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT
In moving the court that the judgment in “Shepherd v. Gage” be set aside, defendant cites the grounds for relief provided by NC Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60B. In sequential fashion, defendant would show the court that:
A) There are grounds for relief as defined in Rule 60B(3) insofar as Ms. Shepherd and her counsel swayed the court in plaintiff’s favor through misrepresentations of social history which distorted the words and actions of the defendant and biased the court through hyperbolic or deceptive expressions of “substantial emotional distress” which was no such thing.
B) There are grounds for relief insofar as extrinsic events and the intrinsic logic of “Shepherd v. Gage” according to provision for relief in Rule 60B(4): the judgment is void.
C) There are grounds for relief according to Rule 60B(5) insofar as the judgment has meaningfully been discharged/satisfied by the hearing of 15 November 2019, in which plaintiff had an extensive opportunity in concert with counsel to confront and interrogate the defendant as to the intentions behind his apparent actions and statements and as to his purposes where the plaintiff is concerned; this occasion for a confrontation of plaintiff and defendant, with counsel, before a district court judge, substantially satisfies the original judgment in that the motive and raison d’etre of the action in the first place was to stage such an in-court confrontation (with defendant in custody) as took place that day. Furthermore (and this is to be emphasized) there are additional grounds for relief according to Rule 60B(5) in that “it is no longer equitable that the order have any future application”: defendant contends that the punishments already inflicted on him in the brief interval from the commencement of this action to the present are already massively out of proportion with the conduct which plaintiff exhibited in support of her “motion to show cause for failure to comply” with the order in question. Notwithstanding the finding of contempt of court (criminal) for 3 of the plaintiff’s SEVEN exhibits, defendant would show the court that even according to Judge Hogston’s ruling that day plaintiff had submitted 4 exhibits of constitutionally protected activities as if these could ever be construed as non-compliance with a court order.
D) There are other grounds for relief from the judgment, insofar as plaintiff and her “romantic partner” Caylan McKay have pursued vindictive, malicious, aggressive, and spurious criminal charges against the defendant William Dawson Gage, effectively conscripting or joining forces with the violent State—prosecutor, police, and detention—in order to further their vendetta against the defendant and to serve the larger purpose in which they have claimed for themselves a stake or share, which unlawful purpose is to OBSTRUCT JUSTICE by defaming the defendant with frivolous or false accusations and dragging the defendant into court on the basis of unsubstantiated claims. In so obstructing the defendant’s efforts to appeal and otherwise agitate in his legal situation plaintiff and her “partner” are merely acting on behalf of their political ally and protector District Attorney Ben David.
MOTION to WITHDRAW CENSURE and TERMINATE SENTENCE for FINDING of CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
HERE NOW then comes the defendant to move this court in the person of Judge Chad Hogston, that he revisit/reassess/reconsider his finding of the defendant William Dawson Gage in willful contempt of court.
Defendant’s alleged contempt was in reference to NCGS 5A-11(a)(3) which provides as a basis for a finding of contempt the “willful disobedience of, resistance to, or interference with a court’s lawful process, order, directive, or instruction or its execution.” Leaving aside the contention by defendant that this order, as construed by plaintiff is not lawful at all but a procedural mechanism for obstructing justice by intimidating the defendant in his efforts to seek justice while insulating the plaintiff from lawful and legitimate scrutiny and inquiry—leaving aside any potential objections to the lawfulness (or not) of the 50C order in question, defendant respectfully finds that the court erred as a matter of law in its finding of contempt.
This error can be seen by citing the text of NCGS 5A-11(c) which makes clear that the court had no authority to make a finding of contempt for the conduct given by the plaintiff and her counsel in her exhibits to the court. The text of 5A-11(c) reads: “No person may be held in contempt under this section on the basis of the content of any broadcast, publication, or communication unless it presents a clear and present danger of an imminent and serious threat to the administration of criminal justice.”
WHEREAS NCGS 5A-12(c) provides that the “judicial official who finds a person in contempt may at any time withdraw a censure, or terminate or reduce a sentence of imprisonment, or remit or reduce a fine imposed as punishment for contempt if warranted by the conduct of the contemnor and the ends of justice.”, defendant William Dawson Gage declares his purpose to move the court in the person of district court Judge Chad Hogston that he withdraw his censure of defendant and terminate the sentence imposed for supposed contempt of court. Moreover, the defendant would show the court that the finding of “direct contempt” as indicated by the heading of the template form (this might be a clerical mistake/ambiguity) would likewise be in discord with the parameters found in NCGS 5A.
Lastly, for the sake of thoroughness, defendant would show the court in support of this motion that Judge Hogston’s findings of fact in his ruling are vague to the point of inaccuracy and that this too might be adequate grounds for withdrawal of censure and termination of sentence.
In his first finding of criminal contempt, Judge Hogston wrote “reached out to her boyfriend via social media & spoke about plaintiff (indirect contact)”. For the record, “Facebook Messenger” is a direct-messaging application which is sometimes embedded alongside the social media website Facebook.com; Messenger is not “social media” strictly speaking, but a means for direct private communications.
In his second finding of criminal contempt, Judge Hogston gives an inaccurate and pruriently distorted description of defendant’s publication on Facebook.com exhibited by plaintiff. Zeroing in on a provocative passage toward the middle of a long and complex body of text (the plaintiff’s exhibit highlighted this passage, and plaintiff went to the trouble of reading this supposedly obscene text to the court in her best radio voice) Judge Hogston overlooked the totality of the supposedly contemptuous post, which might be what led him to his misguided conclusion that the post was “vile” and displayed an “elevated level of criminality” on account of its supposedly obscene character. Judge Hogston describes the post as “re: having sex with plaintiff in front of plaintiff’s mother.”
Respectfully dissenting from Judge Hogston’s description the post in question did not mention in any way whatsoever anything synonymous with the vernacular usage “having sex”. It’s worth pointing out that far from being “vile”, the idea of maternal voyeurism of a daughter is a rather ordinary phenomenon for families living under one roof, and while not socially acceptable per se the idea of such maternal voyeurism is a fairly mild form of deviance compared to various acts depicted in scripture, such as the story of Lot and his daughters. That being said, defendant did not refer to “having sex” or fornication but rather to the “conception of children”, a metaphysical concept, not a form of textual pornography at all but a profound and properly occult process: defendant’s post, among other things, was meant to draw attention to the paradox that you cannot actually observe the act of conception-qua-sexual-intercourse. Only insofar as conception (and this reflects the era of family planning) takes place separately from the sex act with the choice of a couple to conceive can we properly interpret the post in question.
Judge Hogston’s 3rd finding of contempt says defendant “listed plaintiff’s address on social media”. In addition to falling within the protected domain of “broadcast, publication, or communication” defendant would indicate to the court that this Facebook comment was posted in an act of desperate self-defense in an attempt to ward off the impending arrival of the violent vigilante stalker Timothy Joyner, who was demanding to know defendant’s location so he could assault and threaten defendant. It would appear that plaintiff’s “romantic partner” was in direct communication with Mr. Joyner from the same Friday 27 September 2019 on which the 50C order at issue here was granted. Since then Joyner has visited the premises of defendant’s residence three separate occasions.
Thus having shown to the court that his supposedly contemptuous conduct consisted exclusively of acts of “broadcast, publication, or communication” which fall within a domain given statutory exemption/immunity from a finding of criminal contempt, defendant HERE NOW comes to move the court in the person of Judge Chad Hogston for the withdrawal of censure and termination of sentence as provided by NCGS 5A-12(c). This motion is submitted in tandem with a motion by defendant that the underlying 50C order in question and its judgment in favor of the plaintiff be set aside by the court, in keeping with provisions of the NC Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60B(3), (4), (5) & (6). By submitting these motions in parallel defendant wishes that the court recognize the defendant’s anomalous legal circumstances and to take notice of his activities on his own behalf, such as efforts like these to move this court.
Respectfully submitted this
18th day of December, 2019
w/ the Clerk of Superior Court
316 Princess Street, Wilmington
in his own voice, the Defendant
William Dawson Gage